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Public Enemy: The Public
Element of Direct and Public
Incitement to Commit Genocide
Brendan Saslow*
Direct and public incitement to commit genocide has been
an international crime since the 1940s. The public element plays
a role in each international incitement case, yet many scholars
consider it straightforward and unworthy of attention. This
article seeks to analyze jurisprudence, primarily developed at the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, on how to
determine whether inciting to commit genocide is public. This
element is most problematic in cases involving speech through
broadcast media such as television and radio. Moreover if ICTR
case law informs future international criminal proceedings it
may be an issue in a future genocide that involves the Internet
and social media. This Article ultimately concludes with several
suggestions on how factors for finding whether speech is public
or private should evolve in order to account for modern forms of
communication.
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“Public incitement occurs only if the appeal is likely to be heard
by a large, undefined audience.”1

Imagine a depraved government official issuing a message via
Twitter. The message contains a veiled order to thousands of citizens
to violently attack a minority group. The citizens lash out and
slaughter the group nearly to extinction, as performed in genocides
throughout history. To hold the provocateur liable, a law must
predictably consider when speech constitutes a crime.
Incitement to commit genocide is a notoriously problematic
international crime.2 Susan Benesch, founder of the Dangerous Speech
Project and professor at American University, explains that it is
critical to clearly define it.3 Distinguished Chair of Human Rights at
the University of Connecticut, Richard Wilson has approached
incitement by clarifying causation.4 Meanwhile, international criminal
bodies continue to develop speech crimes.5 Despite attempts to clarify
incitement to genocide, defendants have exploited the public element
with varying degrees of success.6 This element may also expand the

1.

Mordechai Kremnitzer & Khaled Ghanayim, Incitement, Not Sedition,
in Freedom of Speech and Incitement Against Democracy 147, 160
(David Kretzmer & Francine Kershman Hazan eds., 2000).

2.

See Richard Wilson, Inciting Genocides with Words, 36 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 277, 293 (2015) (“It is fair to say [incitement to commit genocide] has
been one of the most controversial areas of international criminal law in
the last twenty years.”).

3.

Susan Benesch, Vile Crime or Inalienable Right: Defining Incitement to
Genocide, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 485, 487 (2008) (“It is critical to define
[incitement to commit genocide] properly.”).

4.

Wilson, supra note 2, at 281 (“This Article examines the framework of
criminal accountability for direct and public incitement to commit
genocide and critically evaluates the claim made in ICTR Trial
Chamber judgments that a causal connection exists between
propagandistic speech acts and genocidal acts of violence.”).

5.

Wilson, supra note 2, at 280 (“[I]nternational criminal courts have
increasingly targeted public speech that incites inter-group violence. . .
[a]s international tribunals target speech crimes with ever more
alacrity”).

6.

See Callixte Kalimanzira v. Prosecutor (Kalimanzira English Appeals
Judgement), Case No. ICTR-05-88-A, Judgement, ¶ 152 (Oct. 20, 2010)
(Kalimanzira asserts that the Tribunal’s jurisprudence requires a very
large number of individuals to be exposed to a call to commit genocide
before it can be qualified as direct and public incitement.”); see also
Augustin Ngirabatware v. Prosecutor (Ngirabatware Appeals
Judgement), MICT-12-29-A, Judgment, ¶ 50 (Dec. 18, 2014)
(“[Ngirabatware] submits that: (i) the mere presence of a group at the
vicinity of the roadblock does not suffice to show that the alleged
inciting statements were received by the public as, at best, the
statements were heard by only three persons; and (ii) the group was
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application of international incitement by extending its application to
virtual communications, like email and social media.
Under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (the “Genocide Convention”) and the Statutes of
the Rwanda and Yugoslavia Tribunals, direct and public incitement is
a separate crime from genocide.7 In each of these three instruments,
direct and public incitement to commit genocide exists in a list that
includes genocide and four distinct crimes (conspiracy, incitement,
attempt, and complicity).8 While all four relate to genocide, listing
each in its own independent section allows ad hoc tribunals to convict
defendants for actions that implicate genocide without actually
convicting a defendant of genocide proper.9 This is helpful because
genocide is particularly difficult to prove.10
Direct and public incitement to commit genocide is established in
Article III(c) of the Genocide Convention,11 Article II(3)(c) of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) statute,12 Article
IV(3)(c) of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
(ICTY) statute,13 and Article 25(3)(e) of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC).14 In the international criminal
selected and limited to the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi manning
the roadblock.”).
7.

Thomas Davies, Note, How the Rome Statute Weakens the International
Prohibition on Incitement to Genocide, 22 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 245, 268
(2009) (“The Genocide Convention . . . treats incitement to genocide as
a separate crime. . . . The ICTY and ICTR Statutes follow the Genocide
Convention.”).

8.

The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, art. III(a)–(e), Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S 277
[hereinafter Genocide Convention]; S.C. Res. 955, Annex art. 2(3) U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); S.C. Res. 25704, Annex art. 4(3) U.N.
Doc. S/RES/25704 (May 25, 1993).

9.

See Davies, supra note 7, at 257 (“The fact that incitement is a crime in
itself under the Genocide Convention and the tribunal statutes also
means that a person can be prosecuted for incitement when no genocide
has (yet) occurred.”).

10.

Harry de Quetteville, How do you prove genocide?, TELEGRAPH (Oct.
17, 2008),
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/harrydequetteville/5474057/How_do
_you_prove_genocide/ [perma.cc/W7VW-9TBD ] (“Genocide has
become one of the hardest charges to prove”).

11.

Genocide Convention, article III(a)-(e), Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78
U.N.T.S 277.

12.

S.C. Res. 955, Annex art. 2(3), U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).

13.

S.C. Res. 25704, Annex art. 4(3), U.N. Doc. S/RES/25704 (May 25,
1993).

14.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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context, the ICTR remains the only international criminal tribunal
that has ever indicted an individual for the crime. Neither the ICC15
nor ICTY16 has had occasion to contribute to the crime’s case law.
The public element is noteworthy for its covert power to undermine
rulings of incitement to genocide. In some cases judgments only give
it lip service, whereas, in more recent cases, it has led to acquittals.17
A beneficial approach would distill a method to consistently and
efficiently decide whether incitement to commit genocide is public.
This note attempts to capture the developing complexity of the
public element. It argues that the select and limited factor is more
appropriately characterized as a defense. The place factor must be
appropriately defined and the medium factor should ascend to a more
dominant role of the legal analysis.18 This new structure will help
future courts evaluate the public element given modern virtual forms
of communication. Part I begins by summarizing the development of
the public element, emphasizing the purposes for including it in the
Genocide Convention and the contemporary legal framework
developed at the ICTR. Next, part II recommends that future
decisions approach the select and limited factor as a defense and
clarify the public and medium factors. Part III then considers how
future rulings should develop the public element in regard to email
and social networking platforms. Finally, part IV offers concluding
remarks.

I. Nuremburg To Arusha: The Jurisprudence Of Public
Incitement To Commit Genocide
Direct and public incitement to commit genocide is an inchoate
crime.19 Genocide does not ever have to occur for a defendant to be
convicted.20 To make a conviction, a criminal chamber must find the
15.

Davies, supra note 7, at 248 n.11 (“[N]o incitement cases have yet been
litigated at the ICC”).

16.

WILLIAM SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF
CRIMES 326 (2d ed. 2009) (“There have been no indictments by the
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia for direct and public incitement to commit genocide.”).

17.

E.g., Callixte Kalimanzira v. Prosecutor (Kalimanzira English Appeals
Judgement), Case No. ICTR-05-88-A, Judgement (Oct. 20, 2010).

18.

See infra notes 76–78 and accompanying text.

19.

GUÉNAËL METTRAUX, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND THE AD HOC
TRIBUNALS 256 (2005) (“‘Direct and public incitement to commit
genocide’ is an inchoate offence . . . the Prosecution need not show . . .
that anyone acted upon the act of incitement . . . nor that it produced
any other result.”).

20.

See Davies, supra note 7, at 257 (“The fact that incitement is a crime in
itself under the Genocide Convention and the tribunal statutes also
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accused (1) intended to perpetrate direct and public incitement to
commit genocide, and (2) perpetrated action that constitutes direct
and public incitement to commit genocide.21 Genocidal intent is
assumed to be present when a judge finds intent to commit direct and
public incitement to commit genocide.22 Directness and publicness are
elements of genocidal incitement.23 The public element requires a
finding that both the actus reus was public and the accused had the
mens rea to perpetrate incitement to genocide that was public.24 This
element does not fit squarely within the traditional elements of a
crime (actus reus and mens rea).25
Throughout its history scholars have treated the public element
as straightforward.26 Still, as an element, if a court does not find that
means that a person can be prosecuted for incitement when no genocide
has (yet) occurred.”).
21.

See SCHABAS, supra note 16, at 319 (“It is sufficient to establish that
direct and public incitement took place, that the direct and public
incitement was intentional, and that it was carried out with the intent
to destroy in whole or in part a protected group as such.”); see also
Callixte Kalimanzira v. Prosecutor (Kalimanzira English Trial
Judgement), Case No. ICTR-05-88-T, Judgement, ¶ 510 (June 22,
2009); Callixte Nzabonimana v. Prosecutor (Nzabonimana Appeals
Judgement), Case No. ICTR-98-44D-A, Judgement, ¶ 121 (Sept. 29,
2014).

22.

SCHABAS, supra note 16, at 326 (“To be convicted of direct and public
incitement, it must be established that the perpetrator had a genocidal
intent.”). Genocidal intent is considered a dolus specialis or special
intent. Special intent as applied to genocide requires that “[t]he acts . . .
must be done with intent to destroy the group as such in whole or in
part.” Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. and Herz.
v. Serb. and Montenegro) 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶ 187 (Feb. 26). Professor
William Schabas points out that no individual could “plausibly be
responsible for destroying a group in whole or in part.” SCHABAS, supra
note 16, at 280. Genocidal intent is a high burden due to the fact that
“genocide is an organized and not a spontaneous crime.” SCHABAS, supra
note 16, at 246.

23.

Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (Akayesu English Trial Judgement),
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 556–57 (Sept. 2, 1998) (“The
public element of incitement to commit genocide may be better
appreciated in light of two factors . . . . The ‘direct’ element of
incitement implies that the incitement assume a direct form”).

24.

Nzabonimana Appeals Judgement, Case No. ICTR98-44D-A, ¶ 129 (“the
Appeals Chamber notes that establishing the public element requires
not only that the accused publicly incited (actus reus), but also that the
accused had the intent to incite publicly (mens rea)”).

25.

Id.

26.

See ROBERT CRYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW AND PROCEDURE 315 (2007) (“So far, determining what is public
has not been too difficult.”); see also SCHABAS, supra note 16, at 329
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incitement was public, then it cannot convict a defendant.27
Interestingly, defendants cannot be convicted for inciting genocide in
private.28 If a superior incites his or her subordinates to commit
genocide, that conversation is likely to be considered private.29 The
drafters of the Genocide Convention chose this method to limit the
inchoate breadth of incitement to genocide.30 The modern definition of
“public” relies on civil law formulations and the International Law
Commission’s 1996 definition. Under the ILC definition, “public
incitement is characterized by a call for criminal action to a number
of individuals in a public place or to members of the general public at
large by such means as the mass media.”31 In other words, incitement
(“The word ‘public’ is the less difficult [element of incitement] to
interpret.”).
27.

E.g., Callixte Kalimanzira v. Prosecutor (Kalimanzira English Appeals
Judgement), Case No. ICTR-05-88-A, Judgement, ¶ 163, 165 (Oct. 20,
2010) (“The Appeals Chamber, however, is not satisfied that the
evidence reasonably supports the Trial Chamber’s findings concerning
Kalimanzira’s intent to incite anyone other than those manning the
Kajyanama roadblock. . . . Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber grants
Kalimanzira’s Eighth and Ninth Grounds of Appeal and reverses the
convictions for direct and public incitement based on the events at the
Jaguar and Kajyanama roadblocks.”). But see, SCHABAS, supra note 16,
at 319 (“incitement in private is subsumed within the act of complicity,
listed in Article III(e) [of the Genocide Convention]. Incitement in
private is punishable only if the underlying crime of genocide occurs,
whereas incitement in public can be prosecuted even where genocide
does not take place. . . . incitement, if successful, becomes a form of
complicity covered by paragraph (e)”).

28.

Nzabonimana Appeals Judgement, Case No. ICTR-98-44D-A, ¶
126(“The Appeals Chamber notes that . . . public incitement was
understood as ‘public speeches or in the press, through the radio, the
cinema or other ways of reaching the public,’ . . . it expressly excluded
‘private’ incitement.”).

29.

Kalimanzira English Appeals Judgement, Case No. ICTR-05-88-A, n.414
(“The . . . definition adopted by the Sixth Committee . . . differentiated
acts such as instructions from officials to subordinates or heads of
organizations to members from ‘direct public incitement.’”).

30.

SCHABAS, supra note 16, at 321–23 (“In the Sixth Committee, the
United States . . . contest[ed] entirely any reference to incitement as an
inchoate offence. . . . Poland insisted that prevention was also the goal
of the convention . . . . Belgium urged a ‘happy compromise’, deleting
the phrase ‘or in private’. . . . The Committee voted to delete the words
‘or in private’.”).

31.

Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (Akayesu English Trial Judgement),
ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 556 n. 126 (Sept. 2, 1998). The International
Law Commission was created by the United Nations General Assembly
in 1947. Its purpose is to “promote the progressive development of
international law and its codification.” INT’L L. COMM’N,
http://legal.un.org/ilc/work.shtml [https://perma.cc/RM8S-YGMR]
(last visited July 29, 2015).
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is public when a perpetrator incites genocide in a public place, public
by definition, or to the general public by radio or television.32 It took
60 years for the international community to develop this modern
formula.
A. History of the Public Element Before the Genocide Convention

Incitement to genocide dates to the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg, following the Holocaust.33 Prosecutors
accused German defendants Julius Streicher and Hans Fritzsche of
speech crimes, at the time categorized as a crime against humanity.34
Streicher, editor of the anti-Semitic publication Der Stürmer,35 was
convicted of “incitement to murder and extermination” for
“persecution on political and racial grounds.”36 He was the only IMT
defendant executed exclusively for crimes against humanity.37
Fritzsche was a senior Nazi official and radio announcer known for his

32.

Examples of methods for conveying speech to the general public include
“speeches, shouting or threats uttered in public places or at public
gatherings, or through the sale or dissemination, offer for sale or display
of written material or printed matter in public places or at public
gatherings, or through the public display of placards or posters, or
through any other means of audiovisual communication.” Akayesu
English Trial Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 556,
559 (Sept. 2, 1998); Callixte Nzabonimana v. Prosecutor, Case No.
ICTR98-44D-A, ¶ 122 (“The travaux preparatoires of the Genocide
Convention confirm[] that ‘public’ incitement to genocide pertains to
mass communications.”).

33.

Wibke Kristin Timmermann, Incitement in International Criminal Law,
88 INT. REV. RED CROSS 823, 827 (2006) (“Incitement to genocide first
became a crime under international law when the International Military
Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg passed judgment on the accused Julius
Streicher and Hans Fritzsche in 1946.”).

34.

Wilson, supra note 2, at 283 (“the prosecution held the two propaganda
defendants—Streicher and Fritzsche—liable for crimes against humanity
as accessories or abettors who incited and encouraged others.”).

35.

The English translation is ‘The attacker.’ Ronald Koven, Put Your Own
House in Order First, 35 INDEX ON CENSORSHIP 177 (2006) (“Nobody
ever thought to allege that the Holocaust happened in World War II
because of Nazi propaganda minister Josef Goebbels or Julius Streicher
and his hate sheet Der Stürmer (The Attacker).”). Streicher infamously
wrote “[t]he Jews in Russia must be killed. They must be exterminated
root and branch.” International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg),
Judgment and Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172, 295 (1946) [hereinafter
Nuremberg Decisions].

36.

Nuremberg Decisions, supra note 35, at 296.

37.

Wilson, supra note 2, at 283 (“Streicher’s case was exceptional in that
he was the only defendant convicted and executed at Nuremberg solely
on Count Four of “Crimes Against Humanity.”).
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radio program “Hans Fritzsche speaks.”38 He was acquitted.39
Streicher, specifically, set the foundation for modern international
criminal liability for incitement to commit genocide.40
After the Nuremburg tribunal, the United Nations drafted the
modern day Genocide Convention, defining genocide for the first
time.41 Article III(c) sets “direct and public incitement to commit
genocide” as an international crime.42 It was adopted into force, as
part of the Genocide Convention, on January 12, 1951, after a lengthy
drafting process.43
In comments to the first draft, the Secretariat explained that
“direct public incitement” did not encompass “orders or instructions
by officials to their subordinates” or by “heads of an organization to
its members.”44 The Secretariat also emphasized the importance of
inchoate offenses in its initial draft.45 It referred to some as
38.

The prosecution argued that Fritzsche “incited and encouraged the
commission of war crimes by deliberately falsifying news.” Wilson, supra
note 2, at 328. Timmermann, supra note 33, at 828 (“Hans Fritzsche
was a senior official in Goebbels’s Ministry of Popular Enlightenment
and Propaganda as well as head of the ministry’s Radio Division from
1942 onwards.”).

39.

Nuremberg Decisions, supra note 35, at 326.

40.

Wilson, supra note 2, at 283 (“In international criminal law,
responsibility for propaganda and violent speech was first established in
1945–46 at the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg in
the Streicher case.”).

41.

SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF
GENOCIDE 29, 40–45, 54–60 (2007) (Citing a speech by Winston
Churchill on August 24, 1941 stating “[w]e are in the presence of a crime
without a name” and explaining Raphael Lemkin’s development of the
term ‘genocide’ and its first legal definition in the Genocide
Convention).

42.

Genocide Convention, supra note 8, at art. III(c).

43.

The process began with the creation of a Secretariat draft. Article
II(II)(2) proposed that “direct public incitement to any act of genocide,
whether incitement be successful or not” was a punishable international
criminal offense. HIRAD ABTAHI & PHILIPPA WEBB, THE GENOCIDE
CONVENTION: THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES 216 (2009). Next, member
states offered comments and amendments then the Economic and Social
Counsel created an ad hoc committee to debate relevant issues. Finally,
the Convention was adopted by the General Assembly. Id. at 644.

44.

Id. at 238.

45.

It offered two reasons. First, genocide is an exceptionally grave crime.
Id. at 237 (“genocide is an extremely grave crime, the effects of which,
once it has been committed, are irreparable”). Second genocide requires
preparation and support from many individuals. Id. at 237 (“[genocide]
is a crime that normally requires the support of a comparatively large
number of individuals and substantial preparation.”). In addition
inchoate crimes serve a preventive purpose, which was probably
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“preparatory acts.” Strikingly, the Secretariat distinguished the
inchoate offense of incitement,46 a crime that excluded inciting orders
from superiors to subordinates.47 Instead, these crimes were eventually
eliminated as types of preparatory acts, but incitement to genocide
survived in its modern form.48 William Schabas, professor of
international law and a preeminent genocide scholar, argues that
defendants are liable for such orders under complicity in genocide,
Article III(e).49 This context complicates charges and may lead to
acquittals if prosecutors indict a defendant for incitement, rather than
complicity.
Debates over incitement, as an inchoate crime, were particularly
fierce. The United States was concerned about limiting free speech.
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, felt that inchoate incitement

important to fulfill the preventive function as indicated in the full title,
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide. Genocide Convention, supra note 8. But see, Wilson, supra
note 2, at 298 (“thus far, no defendant has been indicted for ICG in the
absence of an actual genocide.”).
46.

ABTAHI, supra note 43, at 216 (organizing preparatory acts under
Article II.I(2) and incitement under Article II.II(2)). See also Callixte
Kalimanzira v. Prosecutor (Kalimanzira English Appeals Judgement),
Case No. ICTR-05-88-A, Judgement, n.414 (Oct. 20, 2010) (“The
proposal of the Secretariat differentiated acts such as instructions from
officials to subordinates or heads of organizations to members from
‘direct public incitement.’ . . . These acts were considered as
‘preparatory acts’ and covered by other sections of the convention.”).

47.

Preparatory acts included “studies and research for the purpose of
developing the technique of genocide; setting up of installations,
manufacturing, obtaining, possessing or supplying of articles or
substances with the knowledge that they are intended for genocide;
issuing instructions or orders, and distributing tasks with a view to
committing genocide.” ABTAHI, supra note 43, at 216.

48.

None of the preparatory acts were included in the modern genocide
convention. See ABTAHI, supra note 43, at 216. See also Genocide
Convention, supra note 8 (noting the absence).

49.

SCHABAS supra note 16, at 319; Genocide Convention, supra note 8.
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was not potent enough.50 To strike a balance, the drafters attached
the word “public,” thereby limiting the crime’s application.51
In Ad Hoc Committee sessions, the Venezuelan delegation
suggested adding the terms “publicly or privately.”52 The committee
adopted these words on a vote of five delegates in favor and two
abstaining, but the General Assembly Sixth Committee eventually
eliminated the word “privately.” 53 Venezuela contested the change,
asserting that incitement to genocide could occur in public and in
private. It further alleged private incitement exclusively covered
correspondence via letter and telephone.54 Venezuela’s pleas had little
effect, as the crime was ultimately codified as direct and public
incitement to commit genocide.
B. How the Public Element Developed at the Rwanda Tribunal

Beginning on April 6, 1994, approximately 800,000 Rwandans
were slaughtered.55 Earlier that day dissidents shot the Rwandan
50.

The U.S. contested the Soviet approach in the General Assembly, feeling
that such power could chill and criminalize free speech. See ABTAHI,
supra note 43, at 697, 1527 (“If it were admitted that incitement were
an act of genocide, any newspaper article criticizing a political group, for
example, or suggesting certain measures with regard to such group for
the general welfare, might make it possible for certain states to claim
that a government which allowed the publication of such an article was
committing an act of genocide; and yet that article might be nothing
more than the mere exercise of the right of freedom of the press.”).

51.

SCHABAS, supra note 16, at 329 (“[The terms direct and public] were the
technique by which the drafters meant to limit the scope of any offence
of inchoate incitement.”).

52.

SCHABAS, supra note 16, at 321 (“Venezuela’s suggestion that ‘publicly
or privately’ be added . . . was also accepted.”). Venezuela sought to
expand incitement to the press and radio. SCHABAS, supra note 16, at
321 (“According to Venezuela, the addition of ‘publicly or privately’
would obviate the need for further particulars, such as ‘press, radio,
etc.”).

53.

SCHABAS, supra note 16, at 320 n.73 (“five in favor, with two
abstentions”); SCHABAS, supra note 16, at 322 (“[S]everal delegations,
while supporting the incitement provision, were concerned about the
scope of the Ad Hoc Committee text. Belgium urged a ‘happy
compromise,’ deleting the phrase ‘or in private’.”); SCHABAS, supra note
16, at 323 (“The Committee voted to delete the word ‘or in private’.”);
SCHABAS, supra note 16, at 323, n.91 (“[T]wenty-six in favour, six
against, with ten abstentions”).

54.

ABTAHI, supra note 43, at 1521 (“Venezuela . . . . had serious objections
however, to the deletion . . . of the words ‘or in private’ . . . . Incitement
could be carried out in public, but it could also take place in private,
through individual consultation, by letter or even by telephone. It was
necessary to punish both forms of incitement.”).

55.

Samantha Power, Bystanders to Genocide, ATLANTIC (Sept. 1, 2001,
12:00 PM) available at

426

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 48 (2016)
Public Enemy

President’s plane from the sky.56 His assassination was allegedly a
Hutu plot to scapegoat the Tutsi minority and spark a powder keg of
ethnic hatred.57 Soon after, neighbors wielding machetes, led by
Rwandan officials, massacred people of all ages and genders.
Mere hours after the president’s plane crashed, the Rwandan
Armed forces and militia groups began setting up roadblocks
throughout the country.58 The attendants at the roadblocks acted
violently. Asking passersby for proof of ethnicity, they killed Tutsi
and moderate Hutu civilians on the spot.59 Lasting just 100 days, the
Rwanda genocide has been labeled the most efficient genocide of the
twentieth century.60
When the violence subsided, the Security Council passed
resolution 955.61 The foundational document of the International
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-togenocide/304571/ [perma.cc/87DG-Q62E] (“Using firearms, machetes,
and a variety of garden implements, Hutu militiamen, soldiers, and
ordinary citizens murdered some 800,000 Tutsi and politically moderate
Hutu.”).
56.

PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE
WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES 110 (1999) (On the evening of
April 6, 1996 . . . President Habyarimana’s plane . . . had been shot
down over Kigali . . . . The new Hutu President of Burundi and several
of Habyarimana’s top advisers had also been on board. There were no
survivors.”). Juvenal Habyarimana, an ethnic Hutu, had fallen out of
favor with radical members of his cabinet. Id. at 113 (“Habyarimana’s
assassins have never been positively identified, suspicion has focused on
the extremists in his own entourage”).

57.

Ethnic tensions in Rwanda date back to, and possibly precede,
European colonization, first by Germany then Belgium, as a result of
the Berlin Conference. See id. at 47–58.

58.

Amnesty International, Rwanda: Mass Murder by government
supporters and troops in April and May 1994 2.1 (Apr. 30, 1994)
(“Militia set up roadblocks in Kigali and its suburbs. . . . Evidence of
similar coordinated action was to emerge countrywide in the weeks to
come.”).

59.

Id. (“Each individual passing through these roadblocks had to produce
an identity card which indicates the ethnic origin of its bearer. Being
identified as or mistaken for a Tutsi meant immediate and summary
execution. The killers made no attempt to conceal the killings—or hide
the bodies after the fact, as witnessed by journalists and other foreign
nationals. There was no evidence that either central government or local
government authorities or senior army officers opposed the killings by
those acting on their authority. Quite the contrary, the evidence
suggests the de facto authorities and top armed forces leaders had
ordered and directed even this early stage of the murder campaign.”).

60.

Power, supra note 55 (“[The Rwandan Genocide] was the fastest, most
efficient killing spree of the twentieth century.”).

61.

S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
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Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which encouraged convictions
of high profile individuals accused of orchestrating the genocide.62 The
ICTR is particularly relevant to a discussion of incitement to genocide
because it was the first international criminal body to impose the
crime in its modern form.63 Since its first trial, in January 1998, the
ICTR has indicted over fifteen individuals for incitement.64 Notably,
the ICTR had considerable leeway to interpret the crime, as the U.N.
Ad Hoc Drafting Committee never discussed the meaning of the
words “public” and “direct.”65 The Tribunal, as a result, has produced
the most developed body of jurisprudence on these elements.
62.

S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (The resolution
was created for “the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for
genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible
for genocide.”).

63.

Benesch, supra note 3, at 489 (“[T]he world’s first conviction for
incitement to genocide [was] in the case of a former Rwandan
bourgmestre [Jean-Paul Akayesu].”).

64.

Historic Judgement Finds Akayesu Guilty of Genocide, UNITED NATIONS
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA (Sept. 2, 1998),
http://www.unictr.org/en/news/historic-judgement-finds-akayesuguilty-genocide [perma.cc/3GKE-Z26H] (“[T]he International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, in the first-ever judgement by an international
court for the crime of genocide, today found Jean-Paul Akayesu guilty
of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity.”); see generally Prosecutor
v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (Akayesu English Trial Judgement), Case No.
ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement (Sept. 2, 1998); Prosecutor v. Jean
Kambanda, Case No. ICTR97-23-S, Judgement and Sentence, (Sept. 4,
1998); Prosecutor v. Georges Ruggiu (Ruggiu English Judgement), Case
No. ICTR-97-32-I, Judgement and Sentence, (June 1, 2000); Prosecutor
v. Joseph Serugendo, Case No. ICTR-2005-84-I, Judgement and
Sentence, (June 12, 2006); Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, Ngeze
(Nahimana Trial Judgement), Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgement and
Sentence, (Dec. 3, 2003); Prosecutor v. Eliézer Niyitegeka, Case No.
ICTR-96-14-T, Judgement and Sentence, (May 16, 2003); Prosecutor v.
Tharcisse Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-T, Judgement and
Sentence, (Sept. 12, 2006); Prosecutor v. Juvénal Kajelijeli, Case No.
ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgement and Sentence, (Dec. 1, 2003); Prosecutor v.
Simon Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-01-72-T, Judgement, (Dec. 2, 2008);
Prosecutor v. Callixte Kalimanzira (Kalimanzira English Trial
Judgement), Case No. ICTR-05-88-T, Judgement, (June 22, 2009);
Prosecutor v. Callixte Nzabonimana (Nzabonimana Trial Judgement),
Case No. ICTR-98-44D-T, Judgement and Sentence, (May 31, 2012);
Prosecutor v. Augustin Ngirabatware, Case No. ICTR-99-54-T,
Judgement and Sentence, (Dec. 20, 2012); Prosecutor v.
Nyiramasuhuko, Ntahobali, Nsabimana, Nteziryayo, Kanyabashi
Ndayambaje (Nyiramasuhuko Trial Judgement), Case No. ICTR-98-42T, Judgement and Sentence, (June 24, 2011).

65.

SCHABAS, supra note 16, at 321 (“At no point did the Committee
discuss what ‘direct’ or ‘public’ might mean.”).
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As the first international criminal body to approach an incitement
to commit genocide indictment since the adoption of the Genocide
Convention, the Akayesu Trial Chamber developed the basic
framework. In the case of Jean-Paul Akayesu, Bourgemestre of Taba
commune in central Rwanda, the Tribunal issued its first conviction
for direct and public incitement to commit genocide.66 Early in the
morning, approximately thirteen days after the President’s death,
Akayesu urged a crowd of 100 to 200 Rwandans to “eliminate the sole
enemy.”67 He knew the crowd understood that the enemy was the
Tutsis.68
In finding Akayesu’s speech “public,”69 the Court recognized two
definitions and two relevant factors for deciding future cases.70 One
definition derives from a civil law source.71 It states that “words [are]
public where they are spoken aloud in a place that is public by
definition.”72 The second definition, developed by the International

66.

Akayesu English Trial Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶¶ 674, 734.
Benesch, supra note 3, at 489 (“[T]he world’s first conviction for
incitement to genocide [was] in the case of a former Rwandan
bourgmestre [Jean-Paul Akayesu].”). Akayesu was also the first person
ever convicted of genocide. Benesch, supra note 3, at 512 (“In
September 1998 the Tribunal convicted Akayesu . . . of genocide
(making his case the first such conviction ever)”).

67.

Akayesu English Trial Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶¶ 326, 35862, 673 (“[A]t about 4 a.m., on the night of 18 to 19 April 1994, . . .
.[Akayesu] immediately alerted the police and went to the scene . . . . In
Gishyeshye, he found a body stretched out on the ground . . . . The
Accused puts the crowd at the meeting at about 100 to 200 people . . . .
The Accused admitted before the Chamber that he asked the crowd to
draw closer, and then addressed the crowd . . . . the Chamber is
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Accused clearly called on
the population to unite and eliminate the sole enemy: accomplices of the
Inkotanyi.”).

68.

Id. at ¶ 709 (“Akayesu himself knew of the impact of his statements on
the crowd and of the fact that his call to fight against the accomplices of
the Inkotanyi would be understood as exhortations to kill the Tutsi in
general.”).

69.

Id. at ¶ 674 (“[T]he Chamber is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
that, by the above-mentioned speeches made in public and in a public
place, Akayesu had the intent to directly create a particular state of
mind in his audience necessary to lead to the destruction of the Tutsi
group, as such.”).

70.

Id. at ¶ 556.

71.

See infra Part I.B.1.

72.

Akayesu English Trial Judgement, ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 556 (“A line of
authority commonly followed in Civil law systems would regard words
as being public where they were spoken aloud in a place that were
public by definition.”).
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Law Commission (ILC), expands upon the first.73 It incorporates
statements conveyed to the general public through the mass media.74
This second definition, importantly, draws in the Genocide
Convention drafting committee’s intent to punish incitement through
mass media.75
The two “primary” factors, also set forth by the Akayesu Court,
are crucial to the modern analysis.76 The first factor is “the place
where the incitement occurred” (the “place” factor).77 The second
factor is “whether or not an audience is select or limited” (the “select
or/and limited” factor).78 A finding that an audience is select and
limited implies that an audience to the incitement was private, not
public, and therefore the defendant may not be convicted of
incitement.79 Later judgments adjoin two more factors to decide
whether an audience is select and limited. These factors include the
73.

International Law Commission, Report of the Int’l Law Comm’n on the
Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, May 6 - July 26, 1996, U.N. Doc.
A51/10 22 ¶ 16-19 (1996). See also INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION,
supra note 31.

74.

Akayesu English Trial Judgement, ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 556 (“According to
the International Law Commission, public incitement is characterized by
a call for criminal action to a number of individuals in a public place at
large by such means as the mass media, for example, radio or
television.”).

75.

Callixte Nzabonimana v. Prosecutor (Nzabonimana Appeals Judgement),
Case No. ICTR-98-44D-A, Judgement, ¶ 122 (Sept. 29, 2014) (“The
travaux preparatoires of the Genocide Convention confirm[] that ‘public’
incitement to genocide pertains to mass communications.”).

76.

Akayesu English Trial Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 556.

77.

Id. (“The public element of incitement to commit genocide may be
better appreciated in light of . . . the place where the incitement
occurred”).

78.

Id. (“The public element of incitement to commit genocide may be
better appreciated in light of . . . whether or not assistance was selective
or limited.”); Prosecutor v. Juvénal Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T,
Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 851 (Dec. 1, 2003). Later, judgments explain
that assistance really means audience. E.g., Augustin Ngirabatware v.
Prosecutor (Ngirabatware Appeals Judgement), MICT-12-29-A,
Judgment, ¶ 52 (Dec. 18, 2014) (“When assessing the ‘public’ element of
the incitement, factors such as . . . whether the audience was selected or
limited can be taken into account.”).

79.

Prosecutor v. Callixte Kalimanzira (Kalimanzira English Trial
Judgement), Case No. ICTR-05-88-T, Judgement, ¶ 515 n.554 (June 22,
2009) (“At the time the Genocide Convention was adopted, the
delegates specifically agreed to rule out the possibility of including
private incitement to commit genocide as a crime, thereby underscoring
their commitment to set aside for punishment only the truly public
forms of incitement.”). Private incitement to commit genocide is also
confusingly punishable under complicity. See supra notes 27, 48.
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“number of persons” (the “number” factor) and the “medium through
which the message is conveyed” (the “medium” factor).80
Although the Akayesu trial judgment provided a legal framework,
it is noticeably devoid of any explanation on how to apply either
primary factor. Rather, it bluntly found Akayesu’s speech public.81
Cases after Akayesu provide more insight into how the factors apply
in hypothetical scenarios.82
1. Soapbox speeches and clandestine meetings: the primary factors of
public incitement.

The Akayesu judgment is the first word on whether incitement to
commit genocide is public. The case established the two primary
factors. The first describes the place where the inciting speech is
enunciated. The place factor appears intuitive, but has two aspects:
(1) the geographic place where a speaker spoke and; (2) whether a
type of setting is typically public. The Akayesu judgment pinpoints
the geographic location where Akayesu inflamed his audience.83 Two
witnesses indicated that the meeting was held at a crossroads or on a

80.

Ngirabatware Appeals Judgement, Case No. MICT-12-29-A, ¶ 52 (“The
ICTR Appeals Chamber has held that ‘the number of persons and the
medium through which the message is conveyed may be relevant in
assessing whether the attendance was selected or limited, thereby
determining whether or not the recipient of the message was the general
public.’”).

81.

Ostensibly Akayesu’s speech was public because it was in a public place,
a roadside, and the audience was not select or limited. The Canadian
Supreme Court case against Léon Mugesera demonstrates similar
disregard for the public element. Mugesera v. Canada, [2005] S.C.R. 100
(Can.), para. 94 (“The criminal act requirement for incitement to
genocide has two elements: the act of incitement must be direct and it
must be public. . . . The speech was public. We need only consider the
meaning of the requirement that it be direct.”).

82.

E.g., Callixte Nzabonimana v. Prosecutor (Nzabonimana Appeals
Judgement), Case No. ICTR-98-44D-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 231–32 (Sept.
29, 2014) (“The Appeals Chamber considers that, though not required,
the number of persons and the medium through which the message is
conveyed may be relevant in assessing whether the attendance was
selected or limited . . . . The Appeals Chamber observes the Trial
Chamber’s consideration that: (i) the audience consisted of
approximately 20 members of the general population, including Tutsis,
who happened to be present in the area at the time; and (ii) the
incitement occurred in an undeniably public location.”).

83.

Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (Akayesu English Trial Judgement),
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, ¶ 359 (Sept. 2, 1998) (“[T]he
Accused was present in Gishyeshye, during the early hours of 19 April
1994, that he joined the crowd gathered around the body of a young
member of the Interahamwe militia, and that he took that opportunity
to address the people.”).
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street.84 Still, the court never formally held that the speech was
enunciated on a road, and that roads are public places.85 Instead,
Chamber I wrote that a place is public when it is public by
definition.86 Yet the ICTR never explained what “public by
definition” means. It only referred to civil law jurisprudence on public
places, specifically an obscure criminal judgment issued by the French
Court of Cassation from 1950.87 Without a modern articulation of
places that are public by definition the court’s logic seems circular.
The ILC’s second definition extends the place factor by incorporating
“mass media.”88 This is relevant, except it relates more closely under
the modern framework to the second factor: whether an audience is
select or limited.89
In English translations, the ICTR articulates the select or limited
factor in several ways.90 Original French ICTR judgments, deciding a

84.

Id. at ¶ 321 (“Prosecution witness A testified that . . . he went to
Gishyeshye on 19 April 1994, towards 6 or 7 o’clock in the morning,
where he found a large gathering of 300 to 400 people at a crossroads.”).
Id. at ¶ 323 (“[A Witness] confirmed that a meeting was then held on
the road in Gishyeshye, in the presence of [Akayesu]”).

85.

Id. at ¶¶ 358–62, 549–562, 672–675.

86.

Id. at ¶ 556 (“A line of authority commonly followed in Civil law
systems would regard words as being public where they were spoken
aloud in a place that were public by definition.”).

87.

Id. at n.125 (“French Court of Cassation, Criminal Tribunal, 2 February
1950, Bull, crim. No. 38, p. 61.”).

88.

Akayesu English Trial Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, at ¶ 556
(“According to the International Law Commission, public incitement is
characterized by a call for criminal action to a number of individuals in
a public place at large by such means as the mass media, for example,
radio or television.”).

89.

Callixte Nzabonimana v. Prosecutor (Nzabonimana Appeals Judgement),
Case No. ICTR-98-44D-A, Judgement, ¶ 231 (Sept. 29, 2014)
(“[T]hough not required, . . . the medium through which the message is
conveyed may be relevant in assessing whether the attendance was
select or limited, thereby determining whether or not the recipient of the
message was the general public.”).

90.

See Akayesu English Trial Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T,
Judgement, ¶ 556 (Sept. 2, 1998) (whether “assistance was selective or
limited”) (emphasis added); Prosecutor v. Georges Ruggiu (Ruggiu
English Judgement), Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Judgement and Sentence,
¶ 17 (June 1, 2000) (whether “incitement was selective or limited”);
Prosecutor v. Callixte Kalimanzira (Kalimanzira English Trial
Judgement), Case No. ICTR-05-88-T, Judgement, ¶ 515 (June 22, 2009)
(whether “attendance was selective or limited.”) (emphasis added);
Augustin Ngirabatware v. Prosecutor (Ngirabatware Appeals
Judgement), Case No. MICT-12-29-A, Judgement, ¶ 52 (Dec. 18, 2014)
(whether the “audience was select or limited.”) (emphasis added).
Assistance is less precise than audience because it may apply to a
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charge of incitement to commit genocide, consistently use the French
word assistance.91 Translation, from French to English, probably
obscured the meaning of this factor in subsequent decisions. In the
English Akayesu judgment, the ICTR introduced the “select and
limited factor” as whether “assistance” is select or limited to the
inciting speech.92 The English judgment translated assistance, which
means audience or attendance in French, to “assistance” in English.93
Later judgments adopted the more lucid translation “audience.”94 No
ICTR trial chamber or appeal chamber discussed how to apply the
select or limited factor until the Nahimana Appeal Chamber acquitted
defendant Barayagwiza, in 2007.95
The ICTR developed the select and limited factor more
thoroughly in the case of Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza. The Appeals
Chamber reversed Barayagwiza’s conviction for incitement on the
basis that the audience was select and limited.96 His incitement
speaker’s subordinates, which cannot be considered in finding a ruling
public. See supra note 78.
91.

See Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (Akayesu French Trial
Judgement), Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Jugement, ¶ 556 (Sept. 2, 1998)
(“assistance a été ou non sélectionée ou limitée”); Prosecutor v. Georges
Ruggiu (Ruggiu French Trial Judgement), Case No. ICTR-97-32-I,
Jugement, ¶ 17 (June 1, 2000) (“l’incitation a été ou non sélectionée ou
limitée”); Prosecutor v. Callixte Kalimanzira (Kalimanzira French Trial
Judgement), Case No. ICTR-05-88-T, Jugement, ¶ 515 (June 22, 2009)
(“l’assistance était ou non sélectionée ou limitée”).

92.

Akayesu English Trial Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 556.

93.

Compare id. at ¶ 556 (“whether or not assistance was selective or
limited.”) with Akayesu French Trial Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4T, ¶ 556 (“assistance a été ou non sélectionée ou limitée”).

94.

E.g., Ngirabatware Appeals Judgement, Case No. MICT-12-29-A, ¶ 52
(“When assessing the ‘public’ element of the incitement, factors such as
the place where the incitement occurred and whether the audience was
selected or limited can be taken into account.”).

95.

Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza was joined in the Nahimana case. Prosecutor v.
Nahimana, Barayagwiza, Ngeze (Nahimana Trial Judgement), Case No.
ICTR-99-52-T, Judgement and Sentence (Dec. 3, 2003); Nahimana,
Barayagwiza, Ngeze v. Prosecutor (Nahimana Appeals Judgement), Case
No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgement (Nov. 28, 2007). This case has been
called “the most contentious of all the ICTR’s judgments.” Wilson,
supra note 2, at 295. Alexander Zahar, legal officer at the ICTY, calls it
a “very poor precedent.” Alexander Zahar, The ICTR’s “Media”
Judgment and the Reinvention of Direct and Public Incitement to
Commit Genocide, 16 CRIM. L. F. 33 (2005) (“The ICTR’s ‘Media’
judgment marks a low point in international criminal justice, where the
quality of decisions has fluctuated considerably.”).

96.

Nahimana Appeals Judgement, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, ¶ 862 (“In
particular, the supervision of roadblocks cannot form the basis for the
Appellant’s conviction for direct and public incitement to commit
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acquittal opened a new vein of arguments pertaining to the public
element.97 One alleges that a roadblock is per se private.98 A second
suggests that speech is not public until an audience exceeds a
minimum number of people.99 Kalimanzira, the former Rwandan
Interior Minister, won an acquittal, in part, on the second
argument.100 Judge Fausto Pocar took issue with the majority’s
reasoning, in a separate opinion.101 He wrote that the decision created
a dangerous possibility and contended that a group should be
considered public or private based on its location and
characteristics.102 An audience need not be large; a small group may
also be public.103
In Nzabonimana, the court refined the second factor: whether an
audience is select or limited. At the so-called Murambi meeting,
Nzabonimana, an official, endorsed killing Tutsis.104 After the ICTR
genocide; while such supervision could be regarded as instigation to
commit genocide, it cannot constitute public incitement, since only the
individuals manning the roadblocks would have been the recipients of
the message and not the general public.”).
97.

Barayagwiza was a founding member of the Coalition for the Defense of
the Republic (CDR) a Hutu nationalist party. Nahimana Trial
Judgement, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, ¶ 7. He was responsible for
supervising roadblocks in the Rwandan capital, Kigali. Id. at ¶ 707. The
Appeal Chamber reasoned that “only the individuals manning the
roadblocks would have been the recipients of the message and not the
general public.” Nahimana Appeals Judgement, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A,
¶ 862.

98.

E.g., Ngirabatware Appeals Judgement, Case No. MICT-12-29-A, ¶ 50
(“[Ngirabatware] submits that: . . . (ii) the group was selected and
limited to the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi manning the
roadblock.”).

99.

E.g., Id. (“[Ngirabatware] submit[ed] that: (i) the mere presence of a
group at the vicinity of the roadblock does not suffice to show that the
alleged inciting statements were received by the public as, at best, the
statements were heard by only three persons”).

100. Callixte Kalimanzira v. Prosecutor (Kalimanzira English Appeals
Judgement), Case No. ICTR-05-88-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 152, 165 (Oct. 20,
2010) (“Kalimanzira asserts that the Tribunal’s jurisprudence requires a
very large number of individuals to be exposed to a call to commit
genocide before it can be qualified as direct and public incitement.”).
101. Id. at, ¶¶ 41–45 (Pocar, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at ¶ 45 (“In my view, [requiring an audience to be broad] establishes
a dangerous and incorrect precedent linked with the question of what
minimum audience size is required to satisfy the “public” element of the
crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide.”).
103. Id.
104. Nine days after the start of the genocide, Nzabonimana attended the
Murambi meeting with other Rwandan officials including interim Prime
Minister Jean Kambanda. Prosecutor v. Callixte Nzabonimana
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convicted him, Nzabonimana argued, on appeal, that his speech was
private, based on the characteristics of his audience. He argued that
the group was select and limited because the audience was composed
of political officials.105 The Appeal Chamber distinctly agreed.106 In its
decision, on the Murambi meeting, the ICTR explained the select or
limited factor using two subordinate factors. It also implied that
inciting speech may be private, even if it occurs in a public place,
when the audience is private.
2. Tipping points and television: subordinate factors of public incitement.

The Kalimanzira Appeal Judgment was the first to attempt to
pin down an analysis of the select and limited factor through
subordinate factors. The two subordinate factors it articulated are (1)
the number of people in an audience and (2) the medium of the
speech.107 In an extensive footnote, numbered 410, the Appeal
Chamber considered both factors, but focused on the size of audiences
(Nzabonimana Trial Judgement), Case No. ICTR-98-44D-T, Judgement
and Sentence, ¶ 1769 (May 31, 2012) (“On 18 April 1994, the Prime
Minister of Rwanda and other members of the Interim Government,
including Nzabonimana, held a meeting for the bourgmestres of
Gitarama préfecture. Nzabonimana ordered the killings of bourgmestres
and other local officials opposed to the massacre of Tutsis during the
meeting.”). At the Murambi meeting, Nzabonimana ordered people who
opposed massacring Tutsis, killed. Id. at ¶¶ 1769, 1772 (Nzabonimana
made an “explicit threat to kill persons opposing the massacre of
Tutsis.”).
105. Callixte Nzabonimana v. Prosecutor (Nzabonimana Appeals Judgement),
Case No. ICTR-98-44D-A, Judgement, ¶ 380 (Sept. 29, 2014)
(“Nzabonimana replies that the fact that public officials were convened
in their function as public officials excludes the characterisation of the
meeting as public. . . . these officials were selected and convened in their
official capacity and . . . the meeting was purely private. He further
replies that the meeting was held in a closed room devoid of any public
character.”).
106. The Trial Chamber held that Nzabonimana’s speech was public because
“the message of the meeting was intended to be broadcast to the public
at large and evinces that Nzabonimana had the requisite mens rea to
incite genocide publicly.” Nzabonimana Trial Judgement, Case No.
ICTR98-44D-T, ¶ 1772. The Appeal Chamber reversed his conviction.
Nzabonimana Appeals Judgement, Case No. ICTR-98-44D-A, ¶ 385
(“the Appeals Chamber notes the Trial Chamber’s acknowledgement
that the incriminating message was not disseminated by the media.
Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber is of the view that the evidence does
not support a finding that the meeting occurred in a public place.”).
107. Nzabonimana Appeals Judgement, Case No. ICTR-98-44D-A, ¶¶ 231,
384 (“though not required, the number of persons and the medium
through which the message is conveyed may be relevant in assessing
whether the attendance was selected or limited, thereby determining
whether or not the recipient of the message was the general public.”).
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in prior incitement convictions.108 Footnote 410 also referred to three
cases to quantify the size of a typically public audience.109 The Court
found audiences, where a defendant’s speech was deemed public,
ranged from “over 100” to “approximately 5,000 individuals.”110 While
messages that reach 5,000 or more people are generally public,
audiences comprised of individuals fewer than one hundred are harder
to label without more facts.
A factual scenario in the Nyiramasuhuko trial judgment indicates
that when an audience is composed of a single member of the public,
inciting speech is unlikely to be held public.111 In the Butare case,
which joined six defendants, Trial Chamber II found Paulene
Nyiramasuhuko not guilty of incitement to commit genocide.112
Nyiramasuhuko, the former Rwandan Minister of the Family and
Women’s development, allegedly distributed condoms to a civilian
woman, in the presence of four men, directing her to “[g]o and
distribute these condoms to [her] young men, so that they use them to
rape Tutsi women and protect themselves from AIDS, and after
having raped them they should kill all of them. Let no Tutsi woman
survive because they take away our husbands.”113 Chamber II found
that the public element was not satisfied, based in large part on the
number of individuals present.114 It further indicated that the
communication was comparable to a private conversation.115 Based on
Nyriamasuhuko and Kalimanzira alone, it appears that there is a
magic tipping point between zero and one hundred audience members
where public speech becomes private and vice versa.

108. Id. at n.410.
109. Id.
110. Id. (“[I]nciting speeches at public meetings to “crowds” of people –
ranging from “over 100” to approximately 5,000 individuals - were found
to constitute public incitement.”).
111. Nyiramasuhuko Trial Judgement, Case No. ICTR-98-42-T, ¶ 6016.
112. Butare is a region in Rwanda that the case is colloquially called. The
case is officially named Nyirmasuhuko. Id. at ¶ 6186.
113. Id. at ¶¶ 6014, 6016 (“The evidence shows that Nyiramasuhuko directed
her speech to one woman, in the presence of four other men.”).
114. Id. at ¶ 6016 (“the Chamber is not satisfied that the “public” element of
this crime has been established.”).
115. Id. (“In order to possess the requisite mens rea for the crime of direct
and public incitement, the audience must be much broader than that
found in the present circumstance. Here, Nyiramasuhuko’s statements
are more akin to a ‘conversation’, consistent with the definition of
private incitement found in the travaux préparatoires of the Genocide
Convention. There is no indication in the record that anyone other than
those cited was present.”).
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This magic number is the very notion which Judge Pocar took
issue with in his separate opinion to Kalimanzira.116 He asserted that
there should be no threshold. Furthermore, the number of individuals
should not be dispositive of whether or not the speech was public.117
The Nzabonimana Appeal Chamber affirmed Judge Pocar’s reasoning
less than four years later, finding that numbers may be probative but
are not required in an analysis of the public element.118 In other
words, the number of individuals present is a factor; it is not an
element.119
Nzabonimana is a second example of a case where a court
prominently weighed the amount of individuals in an audience of less
than 100 members. In relation to the Cyayi centre, Nzabonimana was
initially convicted for direct and public incitement to commit genocide
when he addressed 30 individuals approximately 250 to 300 meters
from a government office.120 The Appeals Chamber accepted the trial
courts finding that Nzabonimana’s speech to a group, at a
government office, including a Tutsi, and an individual that was
called over, was public.121 The Trial Chamber found that the audience

116. Callixte Kalimanzira v. Prosecutor (Kalimanzira English Appeals
Judgement), Case No. ICTR-05-88-A, Separate Opinion of Judge Pocar,
¶¶ 41–45 (Oct. 20, 2010).
117. Id. at ¶¶ 45, 156 (Pocar, J., dissenting) (“I believe, no threshold exists
and none should be established. There is no clear indication in the
jurisprudence of the Tribunal that a speech must be made to a large
group of people in order to qualify as public incitement.”). Id. at 45
(“There is no clear indication in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal that a
speech must be made to a large group of people in order to qualify as
public incitement. For the purpose of the law, it suffices that the speech
was directed at a number of individuals at a public place or at members
of the general public”).
118. Callixte Nzabonimana v. Prosecutor (Nzabonimana Appeals Judgement),
Case No. ICTR-98-44D-A, Judgment, ¶ 231 (Sept. 29, 2014) (“Though
not required, the number of persons . . . may be relevant in assessing
whether the attendance was select or limited, thereby determining
whether or not the recipient of the message was the general public.”);
see also id. at ¶ 126 (“The number of individuals in the audience is not
an element of the crime of direct and public incitement to commit
genocide.”).
119. Id. at ¶ 231 (“[T]he number of persons present is not an essential factor
in this assessment.”).
120. Callixte Nzabonimana v. Prosecutor (Nzabonimana Trial Judgement),
Case No. ICTR-98-44D-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 887 (May 31,
2012).
121. Nzabonimana Appeals Judgement, Case No. ICTR-98-44D-A, ¶ 129
(“[T]he Appeals Chamber observes that in this specific instance, the
facts used by the Trial Chamber to establish the public element – the
public location, a crowd of approximately 30 people, and audience that
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was composed of 30 people, refining the requisite composition of small
public groups, beyond simply a 100-person threshold. This appeal
judgment permits audiences to be small, yet still public.
The second subordinate factor is the “medium through which the
message is conveyed.”122 The drafters specified that messages
broadcast in the press, over the radio, or in the cinema constitute
incitement.123 This notion was a prominent consideration in the
travaux préparatoires.124 ICTR cases confirm that individuals will be
liable for messages through these media. In one case, the Interim
Prime Minister of Rwanda, Jean Kambanda was convicted for
incitement to commit genocide, based on a video recording of a speech
he delivered that was broadcast during the genocide.125 In another, a
Belgian social worker and radio personality for Radio Television Libre
de Milles Collines (Radio RTLM) pled guilty to incitement to commit
genocide. His speech was found public because his “messages were
broadcast in a media forum and to members of the general public.”126
The medium factor plays a role in decisions where speech that
normally appears public is found to be private. When a speech is
recorded in a private place, it may be found public only if it is
broadcast or disseminated. An issue in the Nzabonimana appeal
judgment, about the Murambi meeting, demonstrates how this idea
applies. Although the Trial Judgment noted the presence of a
journalist and convicted Nzabonimana, the Appeal Chamber found
the conviction an error.127 Instead, it held that the discussion was not

was not selected or limited – showed that the incitement was public and
that Nzabonimana intended it to be so.”).
122. Id. at ¶ 231 (“[T]hough not required, . . . the medium through which
the message is conveyed may be relevant in assessing whether the
attendance was selected or limited, thereby determining whether or not
the recipient of the message was the general public.”).
123. Callixte Kalimanzira v. Prosecutor (Kalimanzira English Appeals
Judgement), Case No. ICTR-05-88-A, Judgement, ¶ 158 (Oct. 20, 2010)
(“the Appeals Chamber recalls that the language of Article 2 of the
Tribunal’s Statute tracks the language of the Genocide Convention. A
review of the travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention
confirms that public incitement to genocide pertains to mass
communications. . . . understood as incitement ‘in public speeches or in
the press, through the radio, the cinema or other ways of reaching the
public.’”). See also ABTAHI, supra note 43, at 986.
124. Nzabonimana Appeals Judgement, Case No. ICTR-98-44D-A, ¶ 126.
125. Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, Case No. ICTR97-23-S, Judgement and
Sentence, ¶ 39(x) (Sept. 4, 1998).
126. Prosecutor v. Georges Ruggiu (Ruggiu English Judgement), Case No.
ICTR-97-32-I, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 17 (June 1, 2000).
127. Nzabonima Appeals Judgement, Case No. ICTR98-44D-A, ¶¶ 382–383.
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public because the journalist never disseminated the message.128 The
Chamber drew a line in the sand designating that a private
conversation only becomes public once it is broadcast.129
C. Summary of the Modern Legal Framework

The modern legal framework is composed of primary and
subordinate factors. A Trial Chamber should begin an analysis of the
public element by considering the primary factors. First, it should
examine the characteristics of the place where the speech was
pronounced. If the location is a street corner, then the place is likely
to be considered public. If the location is a closed room, then the
place is likely to be private. Once it determines if the place is by
definition public, it should move on to the select or limited factor.
This primary factor incorporates the subordinate factors. It relies on a
determination of the nature of an audience privy to inciting speech.
There is no predetermined progression for considering the
subordinate factors. A court may begin by evaluating how many
individuals were present and composed the audience. The court may
use audience size as one indicator to determine that speech is public.
Audiences consisting of many individuals are more likely to be public,
but small speeches do not necessarily point to a private conversation.
Given the existing jurisprudence, it would be erroneous for a
judgment to find that a speech is private based solely on the presence
of a small number of individuals. A court should also consider
whether the speech was broadcast through the media. If speech is
broadcast it is likely to be public. However, if speech is not broadcast
and the audience is small, judges should consider unspecified
characteristics of an audience to determine whether it is public.

II. Suggestions to Clarify the Public Element
Instead of a factor, the select and limited character of an audience
should be a defense. Only defendants have ever raised the argument
and in many cases a judgment can be rendered without considering
the character of an audience. This would also shift the burden to

128. Id. at ¶¶ 385–87 (“[T]he Appeals Chamber finds that the attendance at
the Murambi meeting was selected and limited, that the location was
not a public place, and that the incriminating message was not
broadcasted. The Appeals Chamber therefore finds that no reasonable
trier of fact could have found that the incitement was public.”).
129. Id. at ¶ 385 (“The Appeals Chamber considers that the mere presence
of a journalist does not automatically render the meeting public, rather
it is the broadcast of the incriminating message which would render the
incitement public. In this respect, the Appeals Chamber notes the Trial
Chamber’s acknowledgement that the incriminating message was not
disseminated by the media.”).
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defendants, which is appropriate, as they are in a better position to
shed light on facts relating to the composition of an audience.
Another method to clarify the public element is to designate the
medium and place factors as “or” factors. Both medium and place
should satisfy the public element independently. Media is more
appropriately considered at the first stage of the public element
framework. This recommendation seeks to separate the medium of
speech from the place factor and the select and limited defense by
eliminating any connection to the number of individuals in an
audience. Instead it relies on the broadcast qualities of media.
A. The Select or Limited Factor as a True Affirmative Defense

The select and limited factor is more appropriately considered a
defense to public incitement than a factor. It allows a Chamber to
hold that a meeting was private, absolving a defendant of an
incitement allegation. Relying on the characteristics of an audience,
the defense recalls early debates on what crimes of genocide were
punishable under international law. The select and limited defense
should override both the place and medium factors requiring a court
to rule on the composition of an audience.
One consistent consideration in deciding whether an audience is
select or limited is the number of audience members. This is not
necessary, but may be helpful, to find an audience select or limited.130
It may be an indicator because it helps judges gauge the context of a
speech. Though it is difficult to empirically prove an amount of
audience members, the number may capture the character of
communications and the relationship between the speaker and the
audience.
The second factor, medium of speech, appears to conflate
characteristics of a communication with the amount of audience
members. A more precise inquiry would consider the relationship
between the speaker and his or her audience. In early conversations
on the public element the U.N. Secretariat acknowledged that
communications between superiors and subordinates were not public
speech. Instead of using medium as a way to emphasize the scope of
an audience (i.e. speech that is communicated through the television
reaches large audiences) an analysis could rely on a factor that
considers the relationship between the speaker and any person in his
or her audience.
The number factor may inappropriately exclude speeches that
target a small group of public individuals. If, hypothetically, a speaker
130. Id. at ¶¶ 231, 384 (“though not required, the number of persons and the
medium through which the message is conveyed may be relevant in
assessing whether the attendance was selected or limited, thereby
determining whether or not the recipient of the message was the general
public.”).
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holds a meeting in a room with twelve members of the public, the
relationship between the speaker and audience members is crucial to
determine whether the conversation should be public or private. If all
twelve individuals are members of the public then the meeting may be
found public. However, if the twelve audience members are the
speaker’s subordinates then the meeting may not be found public.
The juxtaposition between the number of individuals present and the
relationship is key. These two factors, much more than number and
medium, align in situations that are typically public and diverge in
more complex factual scenarios.
B. Refine the Definition of a Public Place

Place is a factor in every ICTR case involving the public element.
It allows judges to swiftly pinpoint a location of incitement, explain
the setting’s qualities, and label it inherently public or private. A
crossroads is one example of a place commonly considered public.131 A
commercial center is a second.132 On the other hand, an isolated room
should be considered private. The ICTR’s definition seeks to
incorporate these scenarios, but relies on civil law definitions.133 The
Akayesu judgment alludes directly to the French legal theory,134 but
Trial Chamber I never established which places are public by
definition. That introduces a lacuna into the jurisprudence.
Articulating a method for deciding whether places are public or
private would alleviate that ambiguity.
American public accommodations laws may be one helpful way to
delineate a method for distinguishing public and private places.135
131. Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (Akayesu English Trial Judgement),
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, ¶ 323 (Sept. 2, 1998) (“[A Witness]
confirmed that a meeting was then held on the road in Gishyeshye, in
the presence of [Akayesu]”); id. at ¶ 674 (“From the foregoing, the
Chamber is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that, by the abovementioned speeches made in public and in a public place, Akayesu had
the intent to directly create a particular state of mind in his audience
necessary to lead to the destruction of the Tutsi group, as such.”).
132. Prosecutor v. Callixte Nzabonimana (Nzabonimana Trial Judgement),
Case No. ICTR-98-44D-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 1760
(“Nzabonimana’s speech was given in an undeniably public location to
twenty members of the general population, including Tutsis, who
happened to be present in [Butare Trading Centre] at the time of his
arrival.”).
133. Akayesu English Trial Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 556 (“A
line of authority commonly followed in Civil law systems would regard
words as being public where they were spoken aloud in a place that
were public by definition.”).
134. Id. at n.125
135. American legal theories on publicness such as copyright law may
additionally help clarify the definition of public places. See Julie E.

441

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 48 (2016)
Public Enemy

Both the Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) contain provisions on public accommodations.136 These Acts
characterize public accommodations by anchoring the term “public”
in interstate commerce.137 Though this concept is grounded in the
American Commerce Clause, the goal is similarly to identify public
places and exclude places that are private. The Civil Rights Act of
1964 defines a place as a public accommodation “if its operations
affect commerce, or if discrimination or segregation by it is supported
by State action.”138 The Americans with Disabilities Act distinguishes
public and private “entities.”139 Section 12131(1) defines public
entities as “any State or local government; any department, agency,
special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States
or local government; and the National Railroad Passenger
Corporation.”140 Public accommodations could be characterized based
on their affiliation with government functions, such as roads and
government offices, or private entities, such as a room within a store
or restaurant.
An alternative, but unfavorable, approach would be to eliminate
the public factor altogether.141 A judgment could theoretically rely on
the character of an audience without ever considering the place where
a speech was made. This approach is disadvantageous as supported by
all ICTR incitement cases, because it leads to lengthy and
complicated reasoning, even in straightforward factual scenarios. As a
result, judgments would become less predictable. In international
Cohen, Comment: Copyright’s Private Public Distinction, 55 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 963 (2005) for a discussion of the public-private distinction
in copyright.
136. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012); Americans with Disabilities
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (2012).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (“Establishments affecting interstate commerce or
supported in their activities by State action as places of public
accommodation”).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(6) (“The term ‘private entity’ means any entity other
than a public entity”).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1).
141. See also Mordechai Kremnitzer & Khaled Ghanayim, Incitement, Not
Sedition, in FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND INCITEMENT AGAINST DEMOCRACY
147, 160 (2000) (“The determining criterion for incitement is anchored
to the concrete circumstances of the behaviour and the non-specificity of
the incitees, not the location of the occurrence. The location as such is
irrelevant, and thus the criterion for defining the term ‘public’ should
not include the location of the incitement.”). This method also parallels
the term “publication” in American defamation law, defined as “the
communication of defamatory words to someone other than the person
defamed.” Black’s Law Dictionary 611 (4th pocket ed. 1996).
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criminal cases, where a judgment may be thousands of pages long,
retaining but redefining the place factor balances effectiveness with
efficiency.
C. Elevate the Medium Factor from a Subordinate to a Primary Factor

Though it acts as a subordinate factor in recent ICTR cases,142 the
medium factor interacts with the place factor beyond its present role
under the select and limited factor. Medium is an alternate way to
evaluate whether speech is public. If the select and limited defense
relies on the number of individuals in an audience and the
relationship between a speaker and his or her audience members, then
the medium factor is free to play a more expansive role in the legal
framework.143 For instance, the place factor is only relevant when a
location can be identified. If a defendant records a speech, and a court
cannot ascertain facts about where it was recorded or where an
audience perceived it, then location is impossible to determine.
Medium can step in and describe an abstract place where that speech
exists. If the speech exists in a broadcast medium, or if the place is
public, then incitement should be public. The medium factor is
properly weighed against the place factor as an “or” factor because it
has the potential to describe place when a physical description is
elusive.
The threshold question regarding medium is whether a statement
or speech was broadcast. In Nzabonimana, the Appeal Chamber ruled
that if speech is otherwise private, it is not public until it is
broadcast. If speech is transferred into a recorded medium but is
never broadcast, then the factor is not satisfied.144 However, it is
incorrect to assume that broadcasted messages are public merely
because they reach a larger audience. Instead, broadcasted messages
are public because they have been disseminated to individual citizens.
Finally, medium can stand in for the place factor when a place
analysis is misleading. For example, if someone utters a statement in
142. See supra Section II.B.2.
143. This is appropriate because the Genocide Convention drafters
emphasized the significance of criminalizing broadcasted speech.
Prosecutor v. Callixte Nzabonimana (Nzabonimana Trial Judgement),
Case No. ICTR-98-44D-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 1754 (May 31,
2012) (“the Appeals Chamber has taken into account the travaux
préparatoires of the Genocide Convention, which confirm that “public”
incitement to genocide pertains to mass communications.”).
144. The Nzabonimana Appeal Court found speech private although a
journalist was present to record the speech for dissemination. Callixte
Nzabonimana v. Prosecutor (Nzabonimana Appeals Judgement), Case
No. ICTR-98-44D-A, Judgement, ¶ 385 (Sept. 29, 2014) (“[T]he mere
presence of a journalist does not automatically render a meeting public,
rather it is the broadcast of the incriminating message which would
render the incitement public.”).

443

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 48 (2016)
Public Enemy

a private place, then broadcasts it over the radio into thousands of
homes, the place factor improperly indicates that the location is
private. In this scenario every relevant location is private, but the
speech still effectively reaches the public. Therefore it should be
public. Medium still indicates that the inciting speech is public,
because it was broadcast on television. Preserving the place factor and
matching it alongside the medium factor seeks to simplify inquiries
into the public element without sacrificing complexity.

III. The Future of Public Incitement to Commit
Genocide
Future genocidaires will likely have access to email and social
media. These tools will help them contact an exponentially larger and
more geographically diverse audience.145 This could cause the publicprivate distinction to grow increasingly technical.146 Terrorists already
use social media to target distant recruits, and sympathizers already
spread support online.147 For example, in autumn 2014, Islamic State
145. Peter Beinart, What Does Obama Really Mean by ‘Violent Extremism’?,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 20, 2015, 12:06 PM), available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/02/obamaviolent-extremism-radical-islam/385700/ [http://perma.cc/9MQ4-5DKC]
(“terrorism, . . . is available to people of all ideological stripes and which
grows more dangerous as technology empowers individuals or groups to
kill far more people far more quickly than they could have in ages
past.”).
146. CRYER, supra note 26, at 316 (“The internet and e-mail may raise
interesting questions over the ‘public’ requirement.”).
147. Thomas Tracy, ISIS has mastered social media, recruiting ‘lone wolf’
attacks to target Times Square: Bratton, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/isis-recruiting-lone-wolfterrorists-target-times-square-bratton-article-1.1941687
[http://perma.cc/K68B-86LR] (“[ISIS] the terror group responsible for
the videotaped executions of two American journalists and a British aid
worker are calling for ‘lone wolf’ attacks on Times Square.”). Kathy
Gilsinan, Is ISIS’s Social-Media Power Exaggerated?, ATLANTIC (Feb.
23, 2015, 7:05 AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/02/is-isisssocial-media-power-exaggerated/385726/ [http://perma.cc/847B-2EPP]
(“The high-quality videos, the online magazines, the use of social media,
terrorist Twitter accounts—it’s all designed to target today’s young
people online, in cyberspace.”). Michael Schmidt, Canadian Killed in
Syria Lives on as Pitchman for Jihadis, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/16/world/middleeast/isis-uses-andrepoulin-a-canadian-convert-to-islam-in-recruitment-video.html?_r=0
[perma.cc/JCN8-QHBH]. Ben Hubbard, Jihadists and Supporters Take
to Social Media to Praise Attack on Charlie Hebdo, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/11/world/europe/islamicextremists-take-to-social-media-to-praise-charlie-hebdo-attack.html
[http://perma.cc/CH92-LH5S] (“Within hours of the deadly attack on
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(IS) supporters operated 46,000 Twitter accounts.148 These accounts
produce approximately 90,000 messages, through Twitter and other
social media sites, a day.149 Some even hijack hashtags to draw
attention on social networking sites.150 Government officials, alerted
by these and other past communications, warn that attacks incited by
social media are plausible in western countries.151 So, it is possible by
extension that these communications could develop into calls capable
of inciting genocide.
The distinction between public and private genocide is especially
pertinent to new mediums of mass communication. Twitter and
Facebook present complicated questions because they combine
features of private conversations with public broadcasts. Any user
may send a Facebook message to thousands of individuals. One
method to address the public element in this context is to designate

the French satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo, Islamic extremists and
their supporters were praising the killings and lauding the attackers on
social media”).
148. J.M. Berger & Jonathon Morgan, The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining
and Describing the Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter 7 (2015)
(“During the period of October 4 through November 27, 2014, we
estimate there were no fewer than 46,000 Twitter accounts supporting
ISIS. . . . We estimate that a minimum of 30,000 of these are accurately
described as accounts belonging to ISIS supporters and controlled by a
human user, using the most conservative criteria.”).
149. Eric Schmitt, U.S. Intensifies Effort to Blunt ISIS’ Messages, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 16, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/17/world/middleeast/us-intensifieseffort-to-blunt-isis-message.html [http://perma.cc/9SA2-B3CU] (“With
the Islamic State and its supporters producing as many as 90,000 tweets
and other social media responses every day”).
150. Uri Friedman, An American in ISIS’s Retweet Army, ATLANTIC (Aug.
29, 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/anamerican-in-isis-retweet-army/379208/ [http://perma.cc/K3WX-SQM8]
(“On Twitter and Instagram, [ISIS] hijacks trending hashtags on topics
ranging from British soccer to California earthquakes to disseminate its
messages.”). The Oxford English Dictionary defines “hashtag” as “(on
social media websites and applications) a word or phrase preceded by a
hash and used to identify messages relating to a specific topic[.]” Oxford
English Dictionary (online ed. 2015).
151. Scott Neuman, Homeland Security Chief: Threat to U.S. Malls ‘A New
Phase’ For Terrorists, NPR (Feb. 22, 2015, 12:28 PM), available at
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwoway/2015/02/22/388242488/homeland-security-chief-threat-to-u-s-mallsa-new-phase-for-terrorists [http://perma.cc/25QM-NBR5] (“Johnson
said a video released by the Somali-based group al-Shabab ‘reflects [a]
new phase’ in which terrorist networks publicly call ‘for independent
actors in their homelands to carry out attacks.’”).

445

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 48 (2016)
Public Enemy

virtual platforms public or private. For that reason, public
accommodations laws are particularly relevant.
As of April 2015, there is a circuit split in the United States over
whether private websites are subject to public accommodations
accessibility requirements under the ADA.152 In an advance notice of
potential rulemaking, the Department of Justice stated that some
websites on the Internet should be considered public places, but the
entire Internet should not.153 Using the ADA public accommodation
theory would seek to determine whether virtual speech is located in a
public place. An account accessible to the public should be public. A
message restricted to a small group of viewers, or only accessible by
using a password should not be public.
Establishing a method for distinguishing public and private places
would also help describe virtual forms of speech. For example, a
website would be a public place, but a member-restricted website
would be a private place. Similarly, Facebook and Twitter would
incorporate the second suggestion that broadcast speech satisfies the
medium factor. A tweet, broadcast to the entire Internet community,
would be public. A comment posted to a Facebook user’s wall would
be public, but private messages that are not broadcast to other users
on Facebook would be private. The select and limited defense may
even play a role in determining whether an email listserv is select or
limited, based on the number of recipients and their relationship to
the writer. Once speech is filtered through a medium that can be
accessed without limitation, it is broadcast.

IV. Conclusion
The public element is more complicated than it appears. It recalls
the IMT at Nuremburg and captures an example of how the ICTR

152. Trevor Crowley, Note, Wheelchair Ramps in Cyberspace: Bringing the
Americans with Disabilities Act into the 21st Century, 2013 BYU L.
REV. 651 (2013) (“Some circuit courts interpret ‘place of public
accommodation’ broadly to include nonphysical places, while other
circuit courts interpret this provision narrowly to require a physical
tangible facility—putting virtual places like websites outside of Title III
coverage.”).
153. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Accessibility of Web
Information and Services of State and Local Government Entities and
Public Accommodations, 75 Fed. Reg. 43460 (proposed July 26, 2010),
available at http://www.ada.gov/anprm2010/web%20anprm_2010.htm
[http://perma.cc/89VL-K2BN] (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pts. 35 &
36) (“The Department has also repeatedly affirmed the application of
title III to websites of public accommodations. . . . Although some
litigants have asserted that ‘the Internet’ itself should be considered a
place of public accommodation, the Department does not address this
issue here.”).
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has impacted international criminal law.154 The element has, at times,
led to acquittals and reduced sentences.155 Although the ICTR
adopted factors in 1998, it is still having some trouble efficiently
applying them. The ICC will be the next international body with
power to apply and develop international criminal law on direct and
public incitement.156 It is also possible that the ICC will decide to
impose the crime by drafting entirely new jurisprudence.157
Although the Rome Statute includes direct and public incitement
to commit genocide, along with other forms of individual
responsibility, it is generally accepted that Article 25(3)(e) “direct
and public incitement to commit genocide” is consistent with earlier
formulations of incitement to genocide.158 This wrinkle has the
154. See supra Parts I.A and I.B.
155. See supra note 27.
156. Rome Statute, art. 25(e) (Article 25(e) of the Rome Statute provides
that the International Criminal Court may hold a defendant “liable for
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that
person . . . directly and publicly incites others to commit genocide.”).
Domestic trials may prove helpful in learning about public incitement to
commit genocide in the future. See HJ Van Der Merwe, The
Prosecution of Incitement to Genocide in South Africa, 16
POTCHEFSTROOM ELEC. L.J. 327, 329 (2013) (“although incitement to
genocide is now also criminalised in many domestic legal systems, the
prosecution thereof is almost without precedent on the domestic level. . .
. [I]n general international criminal justice, and in particular the Rome
Statute, place the primary responsibility for prosecuting international
crime on domestic legal systems.”). One example is the case of Yvonne
Basebya who was convicted of incitement to commit genocide in the
Netherlands, in 2013. Rb. 1 maart 2013, JOR 2013, 8710 m.nt EVS
(Basebya/Neth.) (Neth.) available at
http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI%3ANL%3A
RBDHA%3A2013%3A8710 [http://perma.cc/8RJE-LZSY]. The
International Court of Justices may provide another opportunity for
developing incitement and the public element as in the recent case on
incitement between Croatia and Serbia. Application of the Convention
on the prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v.
Serbia), Judgment (Feb. 3, 2015), available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/118/18422.pdf [http://perma.cc/6VB7-RT2G]
(acquitting Croatia of any allegations of incitement to commit
genocide).
157. Thomas Davies, as a student, argued that incitement, in the Rome
Statute, is no longer an inchoate crime. Rather, it is a form of individual
criminal responsibility for convicting an individual of genocide. See
Davies, supra note 7, at 245 (“[T]he full effectiveness of the
criminalization of incitement is threatened by the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, which reduces the status of incitement
from a crime in its own right to a mode of criminal participation in
genocide.”).
158. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 25 (titled “Individual Criminal
Responsibility”). Gerhard Werle, Individual Criminal Responsibility in
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potential to complicate incitement jurisprudence, but, for the time
being, scholars continue to consider it an inchoate crime.159 It is
impossible to know precisely how the ICC will evaluate the public
element, since it has never convicted anyone of incitement to commit
genocide.160
If the ICC chooses to adopt the ICTR framework on incitement,
as it should, it has a wealth of case law, developed over sixty years, to
draw from, as well as an opportunity to reorganize the public element
by adopting measures to ease its implementation.161 The element is
beneficial because it facilitates punishments for inciting speech, while
indicating when defendants will be held accountable under the law.
The ICC may also clarify the public element looking towards new
forms of communication and strategies that mirror communication via
the Internet. The suggestions in this paper seek to achieve that goal:
treating the select and limited factor as a defense, and elevating the
medium factor to primary status alongside and instead of the place
factor. Under such circumstances, public incitement to genocide would

Article 25 ICC Statute, 5 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 953, 956 (2007) (“While
Article 25(3)(a) to (d) addresses modes of criminal participation,
subparagraphs (e) and (f) deal with incitement to genocide and with
attempt and abandonment; this might be seen as misleading from a
structural point of view, because neither incitement to genocide nor
attempt can be classified as modes of participation, but should rather be
classified as inchoate crimes.”). MICHAIL VAGIAS, THE TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 155 (2014)
(“[T]he prevailing view is that [direct and public incitement to commit
genocide] is also an inchoate crime as regards the Rome Statute, on the
basis of the relationship of incitement to the other modes of
responsibility in Article 25(3) and the preparatory works of the
Statute.”). But see Davies, supra note 7, at 246 (“The Rome Statute, by
listing incitement as a mode of participation rather than as a crime in
itself, and by not including incitement in the list of crimes over which
the ICC has jurisdiction, renders the prohibition on incitement far less
effective than it has been in the jurisprudence of the ICTR.”).
159. See VAGIAS, supra note 158, at 155 (“the prevailing view is that
[incitement to commit genocide] is also an inchoate crime as regards the
Rome Statute”); SCHABAS, supra note 16, at 325 (“The Rome Statute
provides for the inchoate crime of direct and public incitement to
commit genocide, faithfully reflecting the Convention on this point.”).
160. The ICC has only issued one arrest warrant for genocide, and none for
incitement to commit genocide. See Sudan: ICC Warrant for Al-Bashir
on Genocide, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 13, 2010), available at
http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/07/13/sudan-icc-warrant-al-bashirgenocide [https://perma.cc/Z4RT-3375]. Al-Bashir’s case was suspended
in December 2014. Sudan President Bashir Hails ‘Victory’ Over ICC
Charges, BBC (Dec. 13, 2014) http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa30467167 [http://perma.cc/CLJ4-PUCV].
161. See supra Section II.
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remain relevant and prevent inciting speech from contributing to
genocide in the future.
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